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Abstract 
With the recent advances in communication technologies for low-power devices, pervasive 
computing environments (PCE) spread as new domains beyond legacy enterprise and 
personal computing. The intelligent home network environment is thing which invisible 
device that is not shown linked mutually through network so that user may use device always 
is been pervasive. Smart devices are interconnected and collaborate as a global distributed 
system to infuse intelligence into systems and processes. This kind of environment provides 
various smart services and makes consequently an offer of convenient, pleasant, and blessed 
lives to people. However, the risk is high as long as the offer is pleasant and convenient. In 
such context, security is still very fragile and there is often a violation of user privacy and 
service interference. For this, a special interest in ubiquitous network security is going up. 
Safety lies primarily in the authentication of users accessing the network. It guarantees that 
only legitimate users can login and access to services indoor the network. In this paper, we 
propose an anonymous authentication and access control scheme to secure the interaction 
between mobile users handling smart devices and smart services in PCEs. In an environment 
based on public key infrastructure (PKI) and Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting 
(AAA), the proposed authentication protocol combines both network authentication 
technique based on symmetric keys and single sign-on mechanisms. The authentication 
protocol is simple and secure, protects the privacy of user and aims to satisfy the security 
requirements.  
Keywords: Anonymity, Authentication, Authorization, Intelligent environment, Pervasive 
Computing Environment. 
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1. Introduction  
The lower cost of components and their miniaturization make possible a world in which 
the electronic is likely to be incorporated into any object. Technically, the addition of a chip 
in an object doesn't represent any particular difficulty and economically, add a chip and an 
embedded small program in an object is not a commercially prohibitive cost. In term of use, 
the additional service rendered is simple, easily discernible by the user and is quite justified. 
Thus, instant communication implementation to our service of panels indicators, screens or 
communication devices as soon as we step across the threshold of a home, a hotel bedroom , 
a warehouse or a public space is the essence of ambient intelligence [1,2] and pervasive 
networks [3]. 
The ubiquitous network [5, 6] is the support of transparent collaboration between 
equipment which constitute it collectively and permanent cooperation of the network of 
personal objects of every individual who crosses its threshold. The ubiquitous network is a 
network of continuity which must, as the origin of its name indicates, be present everywhere, 
all the time and this without breaking. Nevertheless, in an environment where by default each 
object will be connected and accessible, arise necessarily issues of confidentiality, privacy 
and non-intrusion [4]. 
Pervasive computing environments with their interconnected devices and services 
promise seamless integration of digital infrastructure into our everyday lives. While the focus 
of current research is on how to connect new devices and build useful applications to improve 
functionality, the security and privacy issues in such environments have not been explored in 
any depth [7]. 
A pervasive network includes a variety of network protocols and is expected to support 
many service models such as a client-server model, a peer-to-peer communication model, and 
hybrid model. For that, it is difficult to definitely decide which mechanism is suitable for 
pervasive network. Despite all this, to allow only legitimate users in PCEs, securisation of 
interaction between mobile users and services can be performed by various methods namely 
ID-password-based authentication method, certificate-based authentication method, or 
biometric information-based authentication method [8]. 
While traditional distributed computing research attempts to abstract away physical 
location of users and resources, pervasive computing applications often exploit physical 
location and other context information about users and resources to enhance the user 
experience. The same features that make pervasive computing environments convenient and 
powerful make them vulnerable to new security and privacy threats. Control’s gaining of 
users’ devices by hacker, eavesdropping of communications channels, modification of 
sensitive m-commerce transactions, transaction of services or goods in other party’s identities 
are examples of threats taking advantage of ubiquitous communications dynamism and facing 
the ubiquitous environment. Traditional security mechanisms and policies may not provide 
adequate guarantees to deal with the new exposures and vulnerabilities.  
In this context, being particularly interested by strengthening security and preserving 
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privacy into pervasive computing environments, we propose in this paper an authentication 
model for pervasive computing environment (PCE) based on public key infrastructure (PKI) 
and Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA). The authentication protocol 
which corresponds to such infrastructure combines both authentication technique based on 
symmetric keys and single sign-on mechanisms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the 
Pervasive Computing Environment (PCE). In section 3, we attempt to understand the security 
in PCE by identifying issues and challenges. In section 4, we present an infrastructure model 
and an authentication protocol for PCE security. We provide also in this section an evaluation 
of the approach. We conclude in section 5 by highlighting the on-going potential areas of 
future research on security protocol model for ubiquitous networks. 
 
2. Pervasive Computing Environment  
Microprocessors are embedded in the everyday object we use but we are largely unaware 
of it. Marc Weiser [10] put forward the view that ubiquity will have been achieved only when 
computing has become invisible and there is intelligent communication between the objects 
that anticipate our next move. After that, technology has advanced along many dimensions, 
especially in hardware progress and wireless communication technologies. A number of 
leading technological organizations are exploring Pervasive Computing Environment. But it 
is far from Weiser’s vision becomes reality. Pervasive Computing will be the future. 
Pervasive computing will be a fertile source of challenging research problems in computer 
systems for many years to come [4, 11]. 
Pervasive computing will surround users with a comfortable and convenient information 
environment that merges physical and computational infrastructures into an integrated habitat. 
This habitat will feature a proliferation of hundreds or thousands of computing devices and 
sensors that will provide new functionality, offer specialized services, and boost productivity 
and interaction. In an active space which is a dynamic information-rich space, individuals 
may interact with flexible applications that may follow users, define and control space 
function, or collaborate with remote users and applications [7]. 
2.1 Heterogeneous Composition 
The ubiquitous network is a combination of technologies and services offered by the 
cable, wired and mobile telephony, wireless and satellite which could quickly lead to reliable 
and complete network coverage. The tools deployed indoor the pervasive network vary 
between the smallest device with reduced autonomy and capacity of processing and storage, 
and the sophisticated, powerful and very fast computer. The ubiquitous network infrastructure 
is conceived to offer ideal conditions of interconnection of variety of heterogeneous 
components, so that services and applications are accessible at anytime, anywhere and in any 
condition of the network environment [4, 9]. 
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2.2 Dynamic and Self-Organizing features 
A pervasive network is characterized by a self-organisation and dynamism of offer and 
demand: From a wide choice of suppliers, it offers a wide variety of services (see figure 1). 
These services could be utilized by a variety of different ubiquitous network users’ devices. 
Ubiquitous network users move easily in the network and enjoy a dynamism which enables 
them to join or leave instantaneously the network. They can travel from one network to 
another without obstacle. But, each network has its management peculiarity and its security 
policy. For that, the passage from one network to another triggers automatically a dynamic 
reconfiguration in order to make it possible to transiting users to take advantage of the 
offerings of the networks of which they cross [9]. A service provider may at any time become 
a user of other services and vis versa a service consumer can become in turn a service 
provider. To note that certain services provided by the ubiquitous network as TV, multimedia 
and video on demand, require a quality of service which should be supplied by the ubiquitous 
network or the network on which is built the ubiquitous network [4]. 
 
Figure 1. Pervasive Computing Environment 
 
3. Security in Ubiquitous Networks 
3.1 Problem 
With the evolution of communication systems, mobile devices require access to an 
increasing number of services. Using a range of communications technologies, a wide range of 
services could be provided to a variety of ubiquitous computing devices. Ubiquitous 
telecommunications systems will allow heterogeneous wired and wireless access to a vast 
range of services. Increasingly growing, users’ requests and services offers led to the 
collaboration of peripherals of various horizons. It drove to the contribution of several 
ubiquitous computing environments, namely the personal, the home, the office and the vehicle 
environments. 
Current research in pervasive computing focuses on building infrastructures for managing 
active spaces, connecting new devices, or building useful applications to improve functionality. 
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However, security and privacy issues in such environments have not been explored in depth. 
Indeed, several researchers and practitioners have admitted that security and privacy in this 
new computing paradigm are real problems [7]. 
For this, there is a need to work towards the development of secure ubiquitous applications 
and the provisioning by secure environment to operate on. Ubiquitous network infrastructure 
will require the provision of certain degree of security between participating user devices. 
Different degrees of trust may be required for different users and their devices to access 
services in ubiquitous networks. These will be reflected in the ubiquitous network record and 
resources to determine whether the users and their devices are authorized to access. Security 
architecture for ubiquitous network environment should be designed to allow safe execution of 
trusted applications [9].  
The security of pervasive computing environment refers to establish mutual trust 
between infrastructure and device in a manner that is minimally intrusive. In such 
environment, a close relationship binds any smart device to its owner who by a universal 
remote control that kept secured, is recognized by the smart device. When user deploys 
device, secure transient association is used and imprinting can be used to establish shared 
secret. However, control gain of users’ devices by a hacker, eavesdropping of communication 
channels, modification of sensitive commerce transactions, DoS, transaction of services or 
goods in other identities, are among numerous threats that are difficult to track and secure in 
ubiquitous networks [4]. 
Thus, ubiquitous network infrastructure will require the provision of certain degree of 
security between participating user devices. And therefore, there are interesting and 
challenging problems in providing consistency in the management of security and in 
specifying authorization policies for pervasive computing environments [4].  
Authentication is one of the most important characteristics of ubiquitous computing 
security. Authentication provides confirmation of user access rights and privileges to the 
information to be retrieved. During the authentication process, a user is identified and then 
verified not to be an imposer. The authentication process is the assurance process that a party 
to some computerized transaction is not an impostor [4, 11].  
3.2 Challenges 
The ubiquitous network is nowadays almost at hand. The combination of technologies 
and services offered by the cable, wired and mobile telephony, wireless and satellite could 
quickly lead to reliable and complete network coverage. For that fact, hopes on pervasive 
computing environments do not cease to increase. Nevertheless, challenges remain very 
important and the challenge string touches all stages of service life cycle. Traditional security 
requirements include authentication, authorization and confidentiality. The security must be 
defined in terms of services themselves, the way they are dynamically added and removed, 
the way they are discovered and delivered, and their availability. In the other side, a service 
consumer expects from the system its peculiarity protection and a maximum of available 
service with a free access. Between service and consumption, the problem is likely to be 
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complex and interest conflicts may be generated [4].  
Since Cyber-criminals and computer villains are already considering new, ingenious 
attacks that are not possible in traditional computing environments [6], current pervasive 
computing research will not continue without considering privacy in the system [12, 13] and 
securing pervasive computing environments presents challenges at many levels [14, 15, 7]. 
3.2.1 Privacy 
Unfortunately, the privacy of users could be severely threatened. The entire system now 
becomes a distributed surveillance system that can capture too much information about users. 
In some environments, like homes and clinics, there is usually an abundance of sensitive and 
personal information that must be secured. Moreover, there are certain situations when people 
do not want to be tracked. 
3.2.2 Access control mechanism 
The access control mechanisms should allow groups of users and devices to use the 
active space in a manner that facilitates collaboration, while enforcing the appropriate access 
control policies and preventing unauthorized use. While designing access control 
mechanisms, it has to be taken into account that users in the active space cannot easily be 
prevented from seeing and hearing things happening in it. 
 
4. Security Infrastructure Model for Ubiquitous Networks 
4.1 Security System Model 
The adoption of legacy network services as part of the infrastructure supporting new 
ubiquitous applications is a natural evolutionary approach to technology that allows new 
systems to build on top of existing knowledge and technologies. However, the ubiquitous 
computing paradigm does not have the same requirements as those related to traditional 
enterprise and personal computing. It’s characterized by a larger scale and higher 
dependability requirements. To ensure the dependability of ubiquitous applications, network 
services upon which these applications are built must be robust and embed dependability 
paradigms in their design. When adopting legacy network services, it is essential to take in 
consideration the new requirements of the ubiquitous computing environment [16]. 
An open architecture platform must be required to communicate with heterogeneous 
networks. It’s designed for supporting interconnection and compatibility with heterogeneous 
networks. This platform should be independent of hardware and software vendors, should 
connect with existing entire networks, and accept new networks in the future [17]. 
To perform authentication, granting privilege, a centralized authority with interfaces for 
several devices is integrated. In this context, we distinguish two representative protocols for 
reusing tickets within the ticket’s valid time; the Neuman-Stubblebine authentication protocol 
[18] and the Kerberos authentication protocol [19] developed by MIT. [18] takes advantage 
of its ability to prevent replay attacks, within a ticket’s valid time, by not requiring 
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synchronization of the time stamp with each party [17]. Kerberos [20] is a widely deployed 
authentication system. It has several characteristics that make it an ideal candidate for 
implementing authentication systems for ubiquitous applications. Two of the main 
characteristics consist of re-use of cached security credentials and the use of lightweight 
symmetric key cryptography [16]. Key management can be based on trust relationships [14]. 
Tickets and session keys are the fundamental atoms of Kerberos and the Key Distribution 
Center (KDC) is the centralized authority which issues to applicant a ticket [21] that proves 
its identity to others. This service is implemented in each network domain controller [9]. The 
Kerberos authentication protocol [19] consists of Authentication Server (AS) and Ticket 
Granting Server (TGS) [17]. 
AS it is shown in Figure 2, to communicate securely with Service Provider, a user is 
authenticated firstly by an AS and receives after a service issue ticket from TGS. Using this 
ticket, the user achieves service privileges from the Service Provider. Within the ticket’s valid 
time and without communicating with the Kerberos system, the user keeps the privileges for 
the service [17]. 
 
Figure 2. Kerberos protocol 
The pervasive network is comprised of pervasive network users, smart devices, smart 
network services, and centralized authority which is supposed to be responsible for the security 
of every pervasive and do therefore a central role in the pervasive network [4].   
The security infrastructure of a pervasive network essentially boils in the centralized 
authority. It consists mainly of an authentication entity, an authorization entity and a security 
policy. Through their close cooperation, these entities secure access to pervasive network 
components. Such infrastructure is installed in each domain of the ubiquitous network and all 
pervasive network packets must pass through it. Whenever a new pervasive network access is 
detected, it should be able to authenticate, authorize and enforce security policy [4, 22, 23]. 
The centralized authority corresponds to Key distribution Center (KDC) and the 
authentication and authorization authorities correspond to authentication (AS) and ticket 
granting (TGS) servers in Kerberos. 
4.2 Security Policies 
It is important in pervasive computing to have a flexible and convenient method for 
defining and managing security policies in a dynamic and flexible fashion. Policy 
management tools provide administrators the ability to specify, implement, and enforce rules 
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to exercise greater control over the behavior of entities in their systems. Currently, most 
network policies are implemented by systems administrators using tools based on scripting 
applications [24, 25] that iterate through lists of low-level interfaces and change values of 
entity-specific system variables. The policy management software maintains an exhaustive 
database of corresponding device and resource interfaces. With the proliferation of 
heterogeneous device-specific and vendor-specific interfaces, these tools may need to be 
updated frequently to accommodate new hardware or software, and the system typically 
becomes difficult to manage. As a result, general purpose low-level management tools are 
limited in their functionality, and are forced to implement only generic or coarse-grained 
policies [26]. Since most policy management tools deal with these low-level interfaces, 
administrators may not have a clear picture of the ramifications of their policy management 
actions. Dependencies among objects can lead to unexpected side effects and undesirable 
behavior [27]. Further, the disclosure of security policies may be a breach of security. For 
example, knowing whether the system is on the lookout for an intruder could actually be a 
secret. Thus, unauthorized personnel should not be able to know what the security policy 
might become under a certain circumstance [7]. 
In order to strengthen the authentication and authorization mechanisms, security policy 
rules are managed by the security policy entity (see figure 3). The administration of this 
entity can vary between an intelligent and automatic generation of rules depending on the 
needs and the behaviour authentication and authorization entities, and the intervention of 
authorized agent. These rules strengthen particularly the decision-making of the security 
entities and generally the pervasive network security. 
 
Figure 3. Security infrastructure for pervasive network 
Based on these rules, the authentication and authorization entities authenticate and 
authorise users or devices accessing the pervasive network [23, 28, 29]. Thus, the pervasive 
computing environment will be able to provide services to only legitimate members and 
make each user of the pervasive network reliable and able to use safely the pervasive network 
services. 
4.3 Proposed Protocol 
The authentication process involves principals and a principal authentication and 
authorization authority. Principals represent users and services registered in the domain. A 
database of principals is maintained and secret keys are shared between authority and each 
one of principals. The protocol realizes user’s access to offered services in three types of 
exchanges developed in three types of operations: the protocol exchanges include the 
Authentication Server (AS) exchange, the Ticket Granting Service (TGS) exchange and the 
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Server Provider (AP) exchange [16]. The process is shown in figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. Chronology of authentication 
As result, from these three exchanges, three types of operations [9] are formed. They 
include: 
Authentication stage: By single sign-on techniques, user is authenticated by 
Authentication Server (AS). Then, once user gets a ticket with a limited lifetime from ticket 
granting server (TGS), he obtains a right to request access to authorized services. 
Access control stage: By detainning a ticket with a limited lifetime, user can receive a 
service acces authorization from solicited services providers. The ticket contains an implicit 
authentication and recognition by providers of services that the user has access right. 
Key negotiation stage: Two session keys are generated in the protocol; the first one is 
delivered by the Authentication Server (AS) to the user for communication between user and 
Ticket Granting Server (TGS), the second is delivered by the TGS to the user for 
communication between user and the service provider. 
Table 1. Notations used in the proposed scheme. 
Symbol Definition 
Ui User i 
Sj Service j 
IDi User's identity 
TIDi Transformed user's identity 
PWi User's chosen password 
AS Authentication Server 
TGS Ticket Granting Server 
h(.) One-way hash function 
TA Timestamp generated by A 
LA Ticket lifetime 
ALUi Access level of Ui 
EPB(A){M} Encryption of message using public key of A 
EK{M} Encrypted of message using symmetric key K 
EA -B{M} Encryption of message using symetric key between A and B 
The proposed authentication scenario is outlined in each step as follows (the notation 
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used is provided in table 1): 
Step 1.   Ui  ⇒  AS : <M1 = EPB(AS) (UIDi,PWi)> 
User Ui logs into his mobile device and requests access to a particular service. For this purpose, User Ui 
transmits UIDi and PWi to AS/AAA. The first message M1 is encrypted using AS’s public key. 
Step 2.   AS ⇒ Ui : <Ticket1,M2>  
Receiving the message M1, AS proceeds as follows: 
1. decrypt the message M1 using AS’s private key,  
2. Verify in its users’ database that it knows Ui, and then authenticates client, 
3. Based on Ui login, AS calculates a symmetric key SK=f(UIDi,PWi), 
4. Generate a random R1, 
5. Compute a Ui′s transformed identity TIDi=f(UIDi, R1), 
6. Generate a random R2, 
7. Compute a session key Ui-TGS: SKey1=h(SK, R2), 
8. Encrypt the message using SK as follows: M2=ESK (ASID,TIDi, TGSID,R2,h(SKey1,UIDi),TAS) where TAS is AS 
timestamp, 
9. Create a ticket and encrypts it using AS-TGS session key: Ticket1=EAS-TGS(ASID,TIDi,TGSID,SKey1,TAS, 
LTGS,ALUi) where LTGS is ticket lifetime and ALUi is Ui acces level, 
10. Deliver Ticket1 and M2 to Ui. 
The 4th and 5th operations are optional to preserve the identity of the user. Otherwise, TIDi=UIDi. 
Step 3.   Ui ⇒ TGS : <Ticket1,M3>  
Receiving the message M2, Ui proceeds as follows: 
1. Calculate the symmetric key SK=f(UIDi,PWi), 
2. Decrypt the message M2 using SK,  
3. Calculate S′Key1=h(SK, R2), 
4. Verify if h(S′Key1,UIDi) ?= h(SKey1,UIDi), 
5. Generate a random R3, 
6. Compute authenticator as follows: M3=ES′Key1(TIDi,TGSID,Sj,R3,TUi) where Sj is the requested service 
and TUi is Ui timestamp, 
7. Send Ticket1 and M3 to TGS. 
Step 4.   TGS ⇒  Ui : <Ticket2,M4>  
Receiving the message M3, TGS proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt Ticket1 using AS-TGS session key and obtains session key SKey1, 
2. Verify TAS and LTGS, 
3. Decrypt authenticator M3 using SKey1, 
4. Verify TUi and TIDi(M3)=? TIDi(Ticket1), 
5. Check if Ui‘s access level (ALi) permits acces to Sj, 
6. Generate a random R4, 
7. Compute a session key Ui-Sj: SKey2=h(R3, R4), 
8. Encrypt the message using R3 as follows: M4=ER3(TGSID,TIDi, SIDj,R4,h(SKey2,TIDi),TTGS) where TTGS is 
TGS timestamp, 
9. Create a ticket and encrypts it using TGS-Sj session key: Ticket2=ETGS-Sj(TGSID, TIDi, SIDj, SKey2, TTGS, 
LSIDj) where TTGS is TGS timestamp and LSIDj is ticket lifetime, 
10. Send Ticket2 and M4 to Ui. 
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Step 5.   Ui ⇒ Sj : <Ticket2,M5>  
Receiving the message M4, Ui proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt the message M4 using R3,  
2. Compute S′Key2=h(R3, R4), 
3. Verify if h(S′Key2,TIDi) ?= h(SKey2,TIDi), 
4. Generate a random R5, 
5. Compute authenticator as follows: M5=ES′Key2(TIDi,SIDj,R5,T′Ui) where T′Ui is Ui timestamp, 
6. Send Ticket2 and M5 to Sj. 
Step 6.   Sj ⇒  Ui : <M6>  
Receiving the message M5, Sj proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt Ticket2 using TGS-Sj session key, and obtains session key SKey2, 
2. Verify TTGS and LSIDj, 
3. Decrypt authenticator M5 using SKey2, 
4. Verify T′Ui and TIDi(M5)=? TIDi(Ticket2), 
5. Encrypt the message using SKey2 as follows: M6=ESKey2(R5), 
6. Send M6 to Ui. 
Step 7.   
Receiving the message M6, Ui proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt the message M6 using SKey2,  
2. Verify content? 
To note that Ui can request a variety of services. He must specify in M3 the requested 
services. TGS sends to him SIDj and corresponding ticket for every Sj requested. 
Assuming that a user Ui, having access in services in local domain, wishes to access a 
service deployed in a remote domain. In order to permit this user’s access to services in other 
network domains, an inter-domains authentication is established. The local KDC and the 
remote KDC share an inter-domain key which is used to secure inter-domain exchange. For 
this purpose, only operations of step 4 in the next proposed protocol are modified as follows: 
Step 4.   TGS ⇒  Ui : <Ticket2,M4>  
Receiving the message M3, TGS proceeds as follows: 
Step 4.1   TGS ⇒  TGSR : < M’3>  
1. Decrypt Ticket1 using AS-TGS session key and obtains session key SKey1, 
2. Verify TAS and LTGS, 
3. Decrypt authenticator M3 using SKey1, 
4. Verify TUi and TIDi(M3)=? TIDi(Ticket1), 
5. Check if Ui‘s access level (ALi) permits acces to Sj, 
6. Encrypt the message using TGS-TGSR session key as follows: M’3=ETGS-TGSR (TGSID,TIDi,Sj,R3,TTGS) 
where TTGS is TGS timestamp, 
7. Send M’3 to TGSR. 
Step 4.2   TGSR ⇒  TGS : < M’4>  
Receiving the message M’3, TGSR proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt M’3 using TGS-TGSR session key  
2. Verify TTGS, 
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3. Generate a random R4, 
4. Compute a session key Ui-Sj: SKey2=h(R3, R4), 
5. Encrypt the message M4 using R3 as follows: M4=ER3(TGSRID,TIDi,SIDj,R4,h(SKey2,TIDi),TTGSR) where TTGSR 
is TGSR timestamp, 
6. Create a ticket and encrypts it using TGSR-Sj session key: Ticket2=ETGSR-Sj(TGSRID, TIDi, SIDj, SKey2, TTGSR, 
LSIDj) where TTGSR is TGSR timestamp and LSIDj is ticket lifetime, 
7. Encrypt the message M’4 using TGSR-TGS session key as follows: M’4=E TGSR-TGS (Ticket2, M4) and send it 
to TGS. 
Step 4.3   TGS ⇒  Ui : <Ticket2,M4> 
Receiving the message M’4, TGS proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt M’4 using TGSR-TGS session key  
2. Send Ticket2 and M4 to Ui. 
The previous protocol rests on the following message flow shown in figure 5. User sends 
an access request to remote service to TGS in his domain. TGS takes care for representing 
him to TGSR of remote service domain and takes over by sending the user’s request to TGSR 
and returning TGSR response to user. This latter can in final phase get closer to remote 
server. By no means in this approach, has user to entreat TGSR to access service in its 
domain. 
 
Figure 5. Remote authentication with direct care 
In the second approach, TGS of user’s domain transmits to him a ticket granting to 
TGSR of remote service domain. Only by getting closer to TGSR that the user will get an 
access right ticket to the remote service requested. 
The operations of the first 4 steps are unchanged. Only the 9th operation of the 4th step 
will be amended as follow: 
9. Create a ticket and encrypt it using TGS-TGSR session key: Ticket2=ETGS-TGSR(TGSID,TIDi,Sj,SKey2,TTGS, 
LTGSR,ALUi) where TTGS is TGS timestamp and LTGSR is ticket lifetime, 
The remainder of the protocol is summarized as followed: 
Step 5.   Ui ⇒ TGSR : <Ticket2,M′′4,TGSID> 
Receiving the message M4, Ui proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt the message M4 using R3,  
2. Compute S′Key2=h(R3, R4), 
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3. Check if h(S′Key2,TIDi) ?= h(SKey2,TIDi), 
4. Generate a random R5, 
5. Compute authenticator as follows: M′′4=ES′Key2(TIDi,Sj,R5,T′′Ui) where T′′Ui is Ui timestamp, 
6. Send Ticket2, M′′4 and TGSID to TGSR. 
Step 6.   TGSR ⇒  Ui : <Ticket3,M′′5 > 
Receiving the message M′′4, TGSR proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt Ticket2 using TGSR-TGS session key and obtains session key SKey2, 
2. Verify TTGS and LTGSR, 
3. Decrypt authenticator M′′4 using SKey2, 
4. Verify T′′Ui and TIDi(M5)=? TIDi(Ticket2), 
5. Check if Ui‘s access level (ALi) permits acces to Sj, 
6. Generate a random R6, 
7. Compute a session key Ui-Sj: SKey3=h(R5, R6), 
8. Encrypt the message using R5 as follows: M′′5=ER5(TGSRID,TIDi,SIDj,R6,h(SKey3,TIDi),TTGSR) where TTGSR is 
TGSR timestamp, 
9. Create a ticket and encrypts it using TGSR-Sj session key: Ticket3=ETGSR-Sj(TGSRID,TIDi,SIDj,SKey3,TTGSR, 
LSIDj) where TTGSR is TGSR timestamp and LSIDj is ticket lifetime,  
Send Ticket3 and M′′5 to Ui. 
Step 7.   Ui ⇒ Sj : <Ticket3,M5>  
Receiving the message M5, Ui proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt the message M′′5 using R5,  
2. Compute S′Key3=h(R5, R6), 
3. Verify if h(S′Key3,TIDi) ?= h(SKey3,TIDi), 
4. Generate a random R7, 
5. Compute authenticator as follows: M5=ES′Key3(TIDi,SIDj,R7,T′′′Ui) where T′′′Ui is Ui timestamp, 
6. Send Ticket3 and M5 to Sj. 
Step 8.   Sj ⇒  Ui : <M6>  
Receiving the message M5, Sj proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt Ticket3 using TGSR-Sj session key, and obtains session key SKey3, 
2. Verify TTGSR and LSIDj, 
3. Decrypt authenticator M5 using SKey3, 
4. Verify T′′′Ui and TIDi(M7)=? TIDi(Ticket3), 
5. Encrypt the message using SKey3 as follows: M6=ESKey3(R5), 
6. Send M8 to Ui. 
Step 9.   
Receiving the message M6, Ui proceeds as follows: 
1. Decrypt the message M6 using SKey3,  
2. Verify content? 
 
The previous algorithm is described using the message flow shown in figure 6. 
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Figure 6. Remote authentication with indirect care 
If the user loses connexion to his basic authority of authentication and authorization by 
migration to the surrounding domains, he will have to register and authenticate to the new 
authority of which he wants to acquire services. He can dispense with the registration 
operation by sending a service request to AS of the new domain. This request initiates a 
dialogue between old and new authorities as follows (it is described using the message flow 
shown in figure 7): 
Step 1.   Ui  ⇒  ASnew : <M1 = EPB(ASnew) (TIDi, PWi, ASID > 
User Ui logs into his mobile device and requests access to a particular service in the new domain. For this 
purpose, User Ui transmits his identity (TIDi, PWi) and the identity of AS that recognizes him to the new 
AS/AAA. The first message M1 is encrypted using ASnew’s public key. 
Step 2.   ASnew ⇒  AS : <M2= EASnew-AS (TIDi, PWi)> 
Receiving the message M1, ASnew proceeds as follows: 
1. decrypt the message M1 using ASnew’s private key,  
2. Encrypt using ASnew-AS session key the identity of user to be identified and transmits it to AS, 
Step 3.   AS ⇒  ASnew  
Receiving the message M2, AS proceeds as follows: 
1. decrypt the message M2 using ASnew-AS session key,  
2. Verify in its users’ database that it knows Ui, and then authenticates the message of ASnew. AS sends 
the information requested by ASnew if necessary. 
 
Figure 7. Migration to neighbouring domain 
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Recognizing Ui, ASnew will start the authentication process for Ui’s acces to services of 
the new domain. 
4.4 Proposed Protocol Evaluation 
Under the assumption that public key or symmetric key infrastructure is used according 
to TGS’s storage and computation capabilities, the symmetric key is shared between AS and 
TGS. If AS is an additionnel component to bring to the system in order to form a security 
infrastructure, TGS may be an already existing component; this later may be a Home 
Gateway in ubiquitous home network [30, 31] or a base station in Wireless Sensor Network 
[32]. In these cases, as authentication mechanism of AS in the ubiquitous environment, TGS 
(HGW or BS) knows that AS is legitimate using the PKI-based public key algorithm or 
symmetric algorithm. Generally, Communications in ubiquitous networks can be secured at 
all levels by use of symmetric algorithm which is computationally fast: Both provider and 
consumer of services trust AS and TGS. A symmetric key is also shared between TGS and 
service provider SP. The KDC composed of AS and TGS manages the environment, 
authenticates users, grants privileges, and controls accounting. 
To note that encryption by public keys prevent user’s personal information (identity and 
password) from guessing techniques. During authentication and authorization process, the 
user operates in an anonymous manner: His identity is hidden and Ticket Granting Server 
(TGS) knows only transformed identity while service provider may know nothing. 
The transmission of user’s access lever by AS permits to TGS to control the access 
request to the service. The single sign-on mechanism and freshness of messages by 
introduction of time stamp prevent a replay attack. The use of tickets and session keys 
permits to attribute an identity to only its owner and consequently prevents passive and active 
attackers. It fully satisfies the security requirements of pervasive computing environment. 
In order to achieve the authentication operations, only 6 messages have been designed to 
permit a user to access to services indoor the same domain. In other hand, 8 messages have 
been designed in each scenario of user access to services belonging to neighbouring domains. 
Whatever the case, the messages of authentication between user and authority of 
authentication or between user and service provider are almost the same (M1, M2, M3, M4, M5, 
M6). The messages (M′3, M′4) are added for dialogue between TGS and TGSR in the case of 
TGS support for access request to remote service. The messages (M′′4, M′′5) are added in the 
case that user fellows a personal approach to access to remote service after receiving from his 
authority a downstream which helps him near remote authority. We recall that whatever the 
access type, it’s always a single sign-on mechanism. 
In the messages that we have designed for the protocol described above, we have used 8 
Bytes to identify the user, authentication authority, authorization authority and service 
provider. It follows at the same for the other parameters. We recall that the messages Mi for 
i∈{1,3,5} are respectively requests of authentication, authorization and access to services 
sent by the user Ui to respectively the autorities of autentication, authorization and service 
provider. Therefore, the messages Mi for i∈{2,4,6} are the returned answers. The messages 
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Mi and Mi+1 for i∈{2,4} carry from the previous requested entity to the user a privilege title 
which allows his recognition by the next requested entity. These messages are a very 
satisfactory size. Figure 8 show the size of the designed messages. Messages M1 and M6 are 
with so low number of bytes because they simply match to the first identification request and 
the implicit final authentication response. 
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Figure 8. Bandwidth cost of messages 
The messages are intended authentication between user and authentication authority of 
user’s domain (AS, TGS) or surrounding domain (ASR, TGSR) and between user and 
provider service in user’s domain (SP) or surrounding domain (SPR). Therefore, messages 
are composed of authentication and messaging information and of privilege title embedded in 
the messages in order to recognize the user by the future protagonist parties in the 
authentication chain by logical and chronological order. The amount of bytes of each message 
taking into account its information is shown in figure 9. 
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4. Conclusion 
In an environment where by default each object will be connected and accessible, it has 
become essential to implement infrastructures which secure the network and offer a pleasant 
ubiquitous setting. Over a wireless and/or wired network infrastructure, a pervasive computing 
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environment PCE consists of three type of entities: mobile users, services and back end 
authentication servers. To make the system architecture more scalable and flexible, a broker 
can be introduced between the user and service. Both users and services can interact with 
brokers to subscribe and distribute services. An access control scheme aims to secure the 
interactions among component entities of PCE. The security system is based on an 
infrastructure consisting of authority by domain. By modular composition, each authority is 
composed of entity of user authentication and entity of authorization for authenticated users to 
acces to the services provided by the pervasive network [4, 8]. 
A legitimate user must pass through 3 phases of recognition: authentication, authorization 
and service access. Authentication entity verifies the identity of the device and particularly the 
user like registration authority in PKI. An authenticated device receives a codified message 
that only authorization entity can decode in the access authorisation request to service 
submitted by the device. The authorization entity trusts the information in the request because 
the authentication entity already verified it. But, it restricts the access right to service. An 
authorized device received a second codified message that only smart server can decode in the 
final mutual authentication between smart service and smart device. This authentication and 
authorization process on 3-step will protect the network services, the users privacy and 
unmasks any adversary attempting fraudulent access by replication or alteration of messages 
addressed previously to authenticated users [4]. 
In the upcoming ubiquitous era, the user will want to easily and securely acquire the 
environmental information in his local area, but at the same time, the ubiquitous environment 
will want to provide its data to only legitimate users. For this purpose, mutual authentication 
between the user and the environment must be provided. The proposition in this paper aims to 
offer services to legitimate user in heterogeneous environment. It safeguards the privacy of 
the user and mutually authenticates user and service with the help of a third trusted party [32]. 
The scheme can be deployed in different domain of ubiquitous environment. It can be applied 
in Wireless Sensor Network [32], Home Network, smart Grid, Body Area Network or 
Ubiquitous Health Monitoring. 
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